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Implicit measures of attitudes may overcome many biases associated with 
explicit measures of attitudes e.g. self presentation effects, however implicit measures 
of attitudes are themselves problematic in different ways.  Issues raised in association 
with implicit measures of attitude range from methodological issues of unreliability to 
basic theoretical questions about what implicit measures of attitude really examine.  
For this reason it is important to clarify that the terms ‘implicit tasks’ and ‘implicit 
measures’ will be used interchangeably throughout this review in referring to implicit 
measures of attitude.   
The aim of this review is to bring together and clarify points of controversy 
associated with implicit measures of attitudes in the hope that this will help to 
overcome the problems related to implicit tasks.  This review will also be useful for 
those seeking to use implicit measures of attitudes as tools rather than as the focus of 
research.  More specifically, this review will clarify the concept of ‘implicit attitudes’ 
and examine how this relates to the concept of ‘explicit attitudes’ as well as 
behaviour.  The low convergent validity of implicit measures of attitude will be 
examined and the processes underlying different implicit tasks will be used to analyse 
the differences between tasks in more depth.  Finally those implicit tasks emergent as 
most promising will be reviewed in order to give suggestions as to which tasks are the 
most useful in which circumstances.  
 
Introduction 
Traditionally, attitudes have been examined using explicit measures, which are 
direct methods of assessing attitudes.  Explicit measures often take the form of 
statements to be responded to on semantic differential scales or questions with Likert 
scale response measures.  The use of qualitative methods such as interviews or focus 
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groups can also be used and provide a richer source of information although 
interpretations are subjective and the procedure is more labour intensive.  Explicit 
attitudes are those that are evident when an individual has more time to provide a 
considered response.  The problem with explicit measures is that they may be 
influenced or contaminated by extraneous factors such as self-presentation biases 
(Rosenberg, 1969) or demand characteristics (Orne, 1962).   
Implicit measures of attitudes are often considered as a less bias prone method 
of measuring an individuals preferences; a way of avoiding the confounding factors 
associated with explicit tasks1.  These range from physiological measures, to 
evaluations of non-verbal behaviour, to the more widely used reaction time tasks.  
Here focus will be on implicit reaction time tasks including affective priming and the 
Implicit Association Test (IAT) as these tasks now dominate the field.   
Affective priming (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell and Kardes, 1986) requires 
the categorisation of a target stimulus as positive or negative when it is preceded by a 
valenced prime stimulus.  If the valence of the prime stimulus and the target stimulus 
match, categorisation is facilitated and can be completed faster.  In this way, the 
valence of particular stimuli can be determined by presenting the stimulus in question 
with prime stimuli of different valences to examine when responses are facilitated and 
when these are inhibited.  The IAT was developed by Greenwald, McGhee and 
Schwartz (1998) and examines the differential association of target stimuli with 
chosen attribute dimensions.  The task requires a target category (e.g. insects) and a 
contrasting category (e.g. flowers) and utilises two contrasting attributes (e.g. pleasant 
and unpleasant) as two further categories.  In the critical task, the participant is asked 
to categorise individual exemplars of each category to one of two combined target-
                                                          
1
 As we shall see this is a contentious point, it may be that implicit measures and explicit measures of 
attitudes are actually measuring different underlying constructs. 
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attribute pairs requiring the same response key (e.g. flowers and pleasant).  Responses 
are facilitated when the target is related to the attribute it is paired with and this 
finding enables the IAT to be used to investigate differential associations between 
stimuli and attributes.  
 
Characteristics of implicitly measured attitudes 
Development 
It is thought that implicitly measured attitudes can develop through two main 
routes, a non-associative route and an associative route (Hermans, Baeyens and Eelen, 
2003).  The non-associative route occurs when a person simply experiences repeated 
exposure to a stimulus; this has been found to result in increased liking for that 
stimulus, referred to as the mere exposure effect (Zajonc, 1968).  The associative 
route occurs through evaluative conditioning methods in which attitude objects are 
paired with other particular valence objects (or feelings) over time so that they then 
acquire an association with that valence.  In fact it has been found that implicitly 
measured attitudes can be developed through a conditioning process without 
awareness of this happening (Olson and Fazio, 2001). 
 
Awareness 
The term ‘implicit’ was borrowed from cognitive psychology in which 
individuals are described as having implicit memory for a prior event when their 
performance shows evidence of the influence of this prior event although they have 
no explicit memory and report no awareness of the event.  Characterised in this way, 
then, implicitly measured attitudes would be considered as attitudes for which 
individual’s lack awareness.  However, results of current implicit tasks indicate that 
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individuals may have some awareness of their implicitly measured attitudes.  In the 
IAT, some participants have been found to be aware of their performance (Monteith, 
Voils and Ashburn-Nardo, 2001) and of what this indicated (although in some cases 
this might be explained by a high correspondence between implicitly and explicitly 
measured attitudes).  
 
Controllability 
Research has previously emphasised that implicitly measured attitudes are not 
able to be deliberately influenced and indeed this has been proposed as one of the 
advantages of this type of measure.  Supporting this assertion, several researchers 
(e.g. Banse, Seise, and Zerbes, 2001; Asendorpf, Banse, and Mucke, 2002) have 
found that it is not possible to fake responses in the IAT when this is normally 
administered.  However, participants more fully informed about the IAT and its 
processes may be able to influence IAT responses.  Indeed Kim and Greenwald 
(1998) found that participants informed about the IAT were able to slow responses on 
certain blocks within the IAT.  Steffens (2004) also found that the IAT is susceptible 
to faking by participants but only slightly.  It seems that when participants have had 
experience of the IAT and when they are informed about the task, obtaining faking 
effects becomes more likely.   
 
Affective in nature? 
In various theoretical models, authors have characterised implicitly measured 
attitudes as measuring something more affective than explicitly measured attitudes 
(e.g., Epstein & Pacini, 1999; Marsh, Johnson, & Scott-Sheldon, 2001).  It is 
intuitively quite appealing to consider implicitly measured attitudes as basic 
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‘upstream’ evaluations which are more emotional and only influenced by cognitive 
information further ‘downstream’ in the thought process.  This has parallels with 
Zajonc’s (1968) concept of emotion without cognition and is thought to be useful in 
explaining phobias and other logic defying behaviour.  The possibility of implicit 
measures correlating with just one component of explicit attitudes might also help to 
explain low correlations between implicit measures and explicit measures.  It would 
be quite elegant to be able to align the affective/cognitive attitude component 
distinction with the implicit/explicit attitude component distinction.  However, the 
situation is likely to be more complex than that.   
A recent study by Giner-Sorolla and Wilson (2003) investigated these 
predictions using an implicit priming task and the IAT along with an explicit attitude 
measure that divided attitude into four component parts of cognitive, hedonic 
affective, self conscious affective and overall evaluative.  Contrary to some 
expectations, results showed that attitudes measured by the implicit priming task 
correlated best with overall evaluations and those measured by the IAT correlated best 
with the cognitive attitude component.  In fact the hedonic affective component of 
attitude did not significantly predict implicitly measured attitude although it did 
significantly predict explicitly measured attitude indicating that it may only be at the 
explicit level that emotion impacts upon evaluations.  Differences found between 
implicit tasks may be explained at an operational level in that it may be that different 
processes are involved in each task (Giner-Sorolla and Wilson, 2003).   
 
The relationship between implicit and explicit measures of attitudes 
How the constructs of implicitly and explicitly measured attitudes relate to 
each other is far from clear.  Empirical examinations of correlations between implicit 
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and explicit measures have been wide ranging, varying extensively between domains, 
but are typically quite low within topics of high sensitivity (Kawakami and Dovidio, 
2001; Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, and Vance, 2002).   
Low correlations between implicit and explicit measures may of course be 
partly accounted for by the very reasons why implicit tasks are utilised, due to the 
elimination of extraneous factors such as self-presentation effects or demand 
characteristics from implicit tasks that are assumed to be present in explicit tasks.  
One might argue that this is unable to account completely for differences though as 
some overlap between implicitly and explicitly measured attitudes would still be 
expected.  We must then look to the theoretical underpinnings of these measures to 
examine further why these differ. 
 
Theoretical advances 
The single attitude model 
The dominant view of attitudes is the single attitude model and this is the 
stance taken by dual process theorists.  Dual process theories explain behaviour as a 
joint function of deliberate and spontaneous processes (see Smith and Decoster, 2000, 
for a review).  This group of theories generally agree on the characteristics of the two 
systems postulated.  Associative processing is described as being learned over many 
experiences.  It occurs automatically and without awareness (although there is 
awareness of the results of processing) and draws on associations that are grouped by 
similarity and contiguity.  Rule-based processing in contrast can be learned in just one 
or several experiences.  This occurs consciously and draws on symbolically 
represented rules that are grouped by language and logic.   
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Implicitly measured attitudes are thought to examine associative processes and 
explicitly measured attitudes, rule-based processes.  To this end it is argued that 
explicit and implicit attitudes are actually just different ways of measuring the same 
things and, in fact, for this reason should be referred to as differing measurements of 
attitudes rather than different attitudinal constructs.  One of the main differences 
among models within dual process theories regards the postulated relationship 
between associative and rule-based processing (Smith and Decoster, 2000).  Some 
models (e.g. Chaiken, 1980) suggest that the two types of processes occur in parallel, 
so both determine attitudes (although one process may dominate).  Other models (e.g. 
Fazio, 1986) suggest that the two processes are mutually exclusive so that only one 
process will determine attitudes at any one time.  In addition, further models (e.g. 
Devine, 1989) suggest that processes operate sequentially, so one process will precede 
the other.   
Dual process theories do generally agree on the fact that implicitly measured 
and explicitly measured attitudes will each dominate in influencing behaviour in 
different situations.  Indeed it has been found that explicit attitudes are more 
predictive of deliberative behaviour and that implicitly measured attitudes are more 
predictive of spontaneous behaviour.  Fazio’s (1990) MODE (Motivation and 
Opportunity as DEterminants of processing) model was developed as an integrative 
framework to explain when behaviour would be spontaneous, and best predicted by 
implicitly measured attitudes, and when behaviour would be deliberative, and best 
predicted by explicitly measured attitudes.  As the name of the model indicates, the 
two factors highlighted as important influences on the type of processing undertaken 
are motivation and opportunity.  When an individual is motivated and when the 
opportunity to reason carefully about a decision exists, deliberative processing of 
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information will occur.  If an individual doesn’t have the time or resources to be able 
to consider decision alternatives in this manner then a spontaneous, implicitly driven 
approach is likely to be taken. 
 
The model of dual attitudes 
The single attitude model contrasts with the model of dual attitudes.  The 
model of dual attitudes attempts to account for the contradictory findings from 
implicit and explicit measures of attitudes which indicate (from the implicit literature) 
that attitudes are enduring and will persist over time, and also (from the explicit 
literature) that attitudes are changeable and depend on the situation.  This view of 
attitudes implies that individuals can hold two different evaluations of the same 
attitude object at the same time (and in fact possibly more than two).  This model of 
dual attitudes proposed by Wilson, Lindsey, and Schooler (2000) suggests that 
individuals may hold an implicit attitude and an explicit attitude that differ from one 
another.  The theory states that the attitude which is endorsed at any one time will 
depend on the situation; if the individual has the cognitive capacity to retrieve the 
explicit attitude and this overrides their implicit attitude then this will dominate. 
The main difference between the model of dual attitudes and the single 
attitude model is that the model of dual attitudes suggests that differing implicit and 
explicit attitudes can coexist without tension.  In this way when attitude change 
occurs, rather than the previous attitude being replaced, it will remain in the 
individual’s mind.  However it is thought that this is not simply just a memory that the 
previous attitude once existed because in certain circumstances this attitude will 
dominate. 
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The Reflective-Impulsive Model 
A more general theoretical approach is that of the Reflective-Impulsive model 
(Strack and Deutsch, 2004).  This builds on dual process theories (and similarly takes 
a single attitude approach) but takes this theoretical position a step further and relates 
these to behaviour.  This model suggests that the reflective and impulsive systems 
operate in parallel, interacting at various stages of processing.  Perceived information 
will always be processed in the impulsive system and, depending on its intensity and 
the attention it is given, it may also be processed in the reflective system.  The 
processes may then combine to determine behaviour.   
In fact a final common pathway, receiving inputs from both impulsive and 
reflective systems is postulated to exist, and is thought to consist of behavioural 
schemata that may vary in levels of abstractness (e.g. Norman and Shallice, 1986).  
Behavioural schemata are part of the impulsive system, and can be activated by 
perceptual or imaginative input, but are also linked to the reflective system through 
the process of intending (e.g. Gollwitzer, 1999).  If a behavioural schema is activated 
above a critical threshold, the behaviour will be carried out. 
A motivational dimension is also included in this model (e.g. Cacioppo, 
Priester and Berntson, 1993) in that the valence of processing in the impulsive system 
may influence behaviour towards either approach or avoidance.  In addition internal 
conditions may influence processing within the impulsive system so that in the 
occurrence of homeostatic disregulation, schemata associated with fulfilling required 
needs will become activated (e.g. Hull, 1943).  Altogether the Reflective-Impulsive 
model forms an integrative framework, quite neatly combining elements from existing 
theories, including behavioural schemata, intentional mechanisms and motivational 
orientation, in order to relate mental processing with behaviour. 
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The relationship between implicit measures of attitudes and behaviour 
Empirically, the examination of the predictive power of implicit measures of 
attitudes has produced mixed results with some studies indicating that implicit 
measures used predicted behaviour well (e.g. Frings and Wentura, 2003) and some 
indicating that implicit measures used did not predict behaviour well (e.g. Bosson, 
Swan and Pennebaker, 2000).  
Generally it is found that implicit measures of attitude will predict 
spontaneous behaviour and explicit measures will predict deliberative behaviour 
(supporting Fazio’s MODE model).  For example, the examination of racial attitudes 
that utilised implicit priming measures of attitudes and self-report measures of explicit 
attitudes found that spontaneous, non-verbal behaviour was predicted by implicit 
measures and verbal behaviour was predicted by explicit measures (Dovidio, 
Kawakami and Gaertner, 2002).  Similar results have been found with the IAT 
(McConnell and Leibold, 2000).   
It is considered that dual process models and the dual attitude model differ in 
how they anticipate that implicit and explicit measures of attitude will combine in 
order to predict behaviour2 (Perugini, in press).  Dual process models, which postulate 
that spontaneous and reflective processes are mutually exclusive, imply an additive 
pattern of combining attitudes to predict behaviour.  In contrast those dual process 
models (including the Reflective-Impulsive model) that postulate that processes 
operate in parallel through a common pathway to predict behaviour, would anticipate 
an interactive pattern of combining attitudes.  Here implicitly and explicitly measured 
attitudes should combine multiplicatively to predict behaviour.  Finally the model of 
                                                          
2
 Although each different theoretical model implies a different pattern of results, correspondence is 
only partial and each is flexible enough to explain each result pattern.    
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dual attitudes would forecast a double-dissociation pattern of combining attitudes in 
which implicitly measured attitudes would predict spontaneous behaviour and 
explicitly measured attitudes would predict deliberate behaviour.   
As yet empirical results have not supported one pattern of results conclusively.  
Perugini (in press) examined these predictions within two different behaviours, 
smoking and eating snacks versus fruits.  The first behaviour, smoking, was 
investigated with regard to two of these possible result patterns, the additive pattern 
and the interactive pattern, and it was found that the interactive pattern of results was 
supported.  In this way, it was found that for neutral explicit attitudes the likelihood of 
smoking increases with an increasing positive implicitly measured attitude.  For 
positive explicit attitudes, the likelihood of smoking increases sharply with an 
increasing positive implicitly measured attitude and for negative explicit attitudes the 
likelihood decreases even with an increasing positive explicit attitude. 
All three possible result patterns were examined within the behaviour of eating 
snacks versus fruits (Perugini, in press) and for this behaviour it was found that the 
double dissociation pattern of results was supported whilst additive and interactive 
patterns were not.  Here, implicitly measured attitudes clearly predicted spontaneous 
behaviour but not deliberative behaviour and explicitly measured attitudes predicted 
deliberative behaviour but not spontaneous behaviour.  Results then remain 
inconclusive with regard to supporting one clear pattern of processes.  It may be that 
different patterns of processes are more clearly supported in different behaviours and 
different contexts (Perugini, in press). 
  
Reliability and convergent validity of different implicit tasks 
 One problem when measuring attitudes implicitly is deciding which task to 
use and because correlations between different implicit tasks have been found to be 
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extremely low this is a serious problem; the choice of task may completely alter 
findings.  An investigation by Bosson et al. (2000) examined a series of implicit 
measures of self-esteem on their levels of validity and reliability.  These included the 
IAT, supraliminal priming, subliminal priming, the Stroop colour-naming task and the 
initials and birthday preference tasks.  Alarmingly it was found that the convergent 
validity of tasks examined, as indexed by inter-correlations, were extremely low and 
non-significant.  There have also been several investigations of the convergent 
validity of the IAT with priming measures.  An examination by Rudman and Kilianski 
(2000) of the relationship between gender and role status found that the IAT 
correlated with the priming measure on some, but not all, measures.  Other 
investigations of correlations between priming measures and the IAT have typically 
yielded non-significant results (Fazio and Olson, 2003).  However, one study that 
used structural equation analysis to control for measurement error in order to 
investigate the relationship between the IAT and priming measures found a highly 
significant almost perfect relationship between measures (Cunningham, Preacher and 
Banaji, 2001).   
 It seems that the lack of convergent validity between implicit tasks then is 
likely to be attributable, to some extent, to the low reliability of implicit tasks.  
Internal consistency may be a problem and this varies widely for implicit measures, 
alphas for conventional affective priming measures range from around zero to around 
0.50 (Banse, 1999) and consistencies for IATs are generally reported at a higher level 
of around 0.80 (Banse, et. al. 2001).  Only IATs are therefore found to be internally 
consistent to a satisfactory level indicating that the use of affective priming measures 
may be problematic in this way and that if affective priming is used, internal 
consistencies should always be examined. 
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Test re-test reliabilities are typically very low.  For example, Bosson et al. 
(2000) found that they were unacceptably low in all implicit tasks apart from the IAT 
and the initials and birthday preference tasks in which these were still low, but 
acceptable at 0.69, 0.63 and 0.53 respectively.  Low test re-test reliabilities may be 
explained if the construct that is being measured (e.g. attitudes) are highly changeable 
from one time point to the next.  In this way differences may also be explained by 
slight changes in context or experience.  However, one should consider that unstable 
attitude measures are problematic no matter what the cause.  Measures must be 
consistent otherwise they have little use in predicting behavioural outcomes.   
Overall, measurement error seems to be a serious problem in implicit tasks 
although this may be reduced by procedures such as increasing the number of trials 
used, introducing a response window and refining scoring techniques.  Lack of 
convergent validity is unlikely to be completely due to measurement error though and 
the extremely low correlations between measures indicate they may not be examining 
the same psychological construct.  Alternatively implicit measures may measure 
different aspects of the same thing and the lack of convergent validity may simply 
reflect the complexity of implicit attitudes.   
 
Underlying processes 
It may be that different implicit tasks are completed by utilising different 
mental processes.  The spreading of activation account (Fazio et. al., 1986) of 
processes involved is one way of thinking about these tasks.  This account suggests 
that the presentation of a valenced stimulus will activate other concepts with the same 
valence.  If a further stimulus with a congruent valence is then presented, it will then 
take less time for its activation level to reach its threshold and the stimulus will be 
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identified more quickly than others.  A stimulus with an incongruent valence on the 
other hand will not have received any activation and will take longer to be identified.   
Conversely, a Stroop-like response conflict may also be responsible for results 
obtained in implicit tasks (Klauer, Robnagel, and Musch, 1997; Wentura, 1999).  In 
this account the associated critical stimulus of a particular valence is assumed to 
automatically produce a tendency to give the response that is associated with it’s 
valence, particularly when the choices of response are themselves valent in nature (i.e. 
‘Pleasant’ or ‘Unpleasant’).  Therefore, when an incongruent stimulus is presented, 
the response activated will differ from the correct response and time will be required 
to resolve this response conflict.  Of course, it may be that in many implicit tasks both 
of these processes plays a part and the process that dominates may vary from task to 
task.  Depending on the mental processes operating to produce responses, it is quite 
conceivable that the results of implicit tasks may differ.  Thus it would be expected 
that those tasks operating due to a spreading of activation process should correlate 
with others operating in this way and less well with those operating due to response 
conflict processes.  This hypothesis remains to be tested experimentally. 
One way of examining underlying processes involved in a task is to examine 
its structural make-up.  De Houwer (2003a) provides a taxonomy of compatibility 
tasks that can be applied to implicit measures of attitudes.  This distinguishes three 
types of compatibility: a/ relevant Stimulus-Response (S-R) compatibility, b/ 
irrelevant S-R compatibility and c/ Stimulus-Stimulus (S-S) compatibility.  Relevant 
S-R compatibility refers to a task when the relevant feature of the stimulus that the 
participant is required to respond to is compatible, or incompatible, with the required 
response.  Irrelevant S-R compatibility refers to a task in which an irrelevant task 
feature that the participant is not required to respond to is compatible, or 
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incompatible, with the required response.  Finally S-S compatibility refers to the 
similarity between different features of the same stimulus or stimuli.  In addition, a 
task may feature more than one of these types of compatibility either in a confounded, 
or an un-confounded, manner. 
 
Table 1: A taxonomy of implicit tasks (adapted from De Houwer 2003a) 
 
 Is there a manipulation of: 
Task S-S compatibility Irrelevant S-R 
compatibility 
Relevant S-R 
compatibility 
Affective 
priming 
Yes Yes No 
IAT / GNAT No Yes* Yes 
AST  No Yes No 
EAST / 
Modified AST  
No Yes* Yes 
 
*But only on target concept trials 
 
For example, affective priming features both S-S compatibility and irrelevant 
S-R compatibility.  S-S compatibility can be noted in that the prime utilised may or 
may not relate to the critical stimulus presented, and irrelevant S-R compatibility is 
evident in that the prime may or may not have the same valence as the appropriate 
response required (see Table 1).  With regard to the IAT (and its cousin the Go No-Go 
Association Task), there is a manipulation of both irrelevant S-R compatibility and 
relevant S-R compatibility.  In the IAT, the category to which the individual stimulus 
belongs is the relevant feature and on some trials this will have a positive valence 
(e.g. flowers) and on others this will have a negative valence (e.g. insects).  In 
addition responses are also imbued with an extrinsic valence because of the response 
assignments, e.g. a left key to be pressed for positive words and flowers, and in this 
way the relevant stimulus feature and the response can be compatible or incompatible.  
Individual stimulus valence is identified as an irrelevant task feature within the IAT 
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and similarly compatibility with response valence may vary.  The Affective Simon 
Task (AST) and its relatives, the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST) and the 
modified AST will be described in further detail later.  It is likely that tasks that are 
similar in structural make-up will produce more similar results than tasks that differ in 
structural make-up and this may also account for the lack of convergence between 
implicit measures of attitude. 
 
Critical review of implicit tasks available 
To summarise, until now we have seen that implicitly measured attitudes can 
be available to consciousness in some instances but are generally not controllable.  
They are not necessarily affective in nature as previously thought and are context 
dependent.  It does seem that different types of implicit task may actually be 
measuring slightly different things, whether these be different aspects of the same 
attitudes or different constructs altogether which may help to account for low 
convergent reliabilities.  Implicit tasks that have emerged as most valid and reliable 
are the priming measures and the IAT.  It seems then that the most useful direction for 
research in this area is to concentrate on these two main types of task and offshoots 
from these.   
 
Affective Priming Measures 
Affective priming measures are one of the most common techniques to study 
attitudes and can be supraliminal or subliminal.  Masked affective priming (Frings 
and Wentura, 2003), with subliminal presentation of attitude-related stimuli, is 
particularly useful in its unobtrusiveness.  Primes in masked affective priming are 
presented at very fast speeds (around 28ms) and are then replaced by a mask to ensure 
that participants remain ignorant of the fact they have just viewed a prime stimulus.  
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This makes it less likely that participants will guess what is being examined in the 
task.   
Types of priming task vary widely as do associated effect sizes and the 
internal reliability measures associated with the different types of task.   Average 
effect sizes are of a medium level at around d = 0.6 (Greenwald, McGhee and 
Schwartz, 1998).  The most reliable versions of affective priming measures seem to 
be variations with a response window of 200ms – 600ms within which responses must 
be provided, which has evidenced test re-test reliabilities of around 0.6 (Cunningham 
et. al., 2001).  This version of evaluative priming is also known to significantly 
enhance the magnitude of effects found (Draine and Greenwald, 1998).   
The processes involved in affective priming were originally considered to 
involve spreading of activation within a semantic network in a similar way to 
associative priming.  However, more recently it has been suggested that the dominant 
process impacting on responses is actually a Stroop-like response conflict (De 
Houwer, Hermans, Rothermund and Wentura, 2002).  Overall it seems that either 
mechanism may operate in this task depending on a number of conditions.  If there are 
several possible response alternatives and the choice of response depends on the 
semantic encoding of possible targets, a spreading of activation is likely to occur.  If 
there is a limited selection of possible responses and all targets of the same valence 
require the same response, a Stroop-like response conflict is likely to occur.  A third 
postulated mechanism for the affective priming task is the affective-matching 
mechanism (Klauer and Musch, 2003).  This assumes that the prime and the target are 
automatically evaluated and spontaneously compared for evaluative consistency.  If 
the prime and target are consistent (e.g. flower and pleasant), this facilitates the 
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production of an affirmative response, whereas if the prime and target are inconsistent 
a negative response is facilitated. 
It must be noted that priming measures examine evaluations at the level of 
individual stimuli.  In this way, if several exemplars of a category are utilised within 
the task in order to examine the evaluation of that category, priming measures will 
provide an estimate of the average rating of all stimuli presented.  The IAT differs in 
this respect in that it examines evaluations at a category level3 and will provide an 
estimate of the rating of the category label itself (De Houwer, 2001, 2003a).  This idea 
is supported by a recent study by Olson and Fazio (2004) that compared a race IAT 
and two versions of a traditional priming measure of racial attitudes, one when race 
was made a salient feature and one when this was not.  A significant correlation was 
found between the race IAT and the priming measure when race was salient but this 
was non-significant when race was not made salient.  This supports the theory that 
priming measures produce results based on individual exemplars as when participants 
were encouraged to consider stimuli at a category level, results corresponded with 
results from the IAT.  For this reason priming measures have been described as more 
realistic than the IAT as it is asserted that category level evaluations will often not be 
noted in real life and it may make more sense, and may be more ecologically valid, to 
examine evaluations of individual exemplars (Olson and Fazio, 2004) 
 
IAT 
 Since its development in 1998, the IAT has become the most widely used and 
widely researched implicit technique used to investigate attitudes.  Its proliferation 
                                                          
3
 In relation to De Houwers (2003a) taxonomy, affective priming effects are mainly due to the impact 
of irrelevant S-R compatibility whereas IAT effects are mainly due to the impact of relevant S-R 
compatibility.   
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was largely due to its flexibility, its large effect sizes and its ease of use.  Nonetheless 
the deluge of research that has investigated the IAT and processes involved has 
uncovered various possible problems with the task.  These include both practical 
problems and conceptual problems.  One practical difficulty is the fact that it is not 
possible to evaluate one concept in isolation; this has to be done in the context of 
some other concept because the task requires the categorisation of pairs of objects 
(Greenwald and Farnham, 2000).  In this way the IAT only measures relative 
evaluations of concepts.  For instance the repeated finding that flowers are perceived 
as more pleasant than insects may not mean that flowers are perceived positively and 
insects negatively.  It may be that both flowers and insects are perceived positively 
but that flowers are perceived more positively than insects or it may be that both 
flowers and insects are perceived negatively but that insects are perceived more 
negatively than flowers. 
Another possible problem is that participants may recode the task at hand in 
order to make it easier.  The so-called figure-ground problem may be an issue here in 
that participants may only focus on one category.  This would reduce the 
classification task to a single search task in which they respond to one category and 
do not respond to the other (Rothermund and Wentura, 2001; Rothermund and 
Wentura, in press).  This of course is more likely when categories differ significantly 
in their salience. 
An obvious consideration is the possible impact of differential familiarity of 
concept exemplars.  Various studies were carried out by Greenwald and colleagues 
(Dasgupta, McGhee, Greenwald and Banaji, 2000; Greenwald, McGhee and 
Schwartz, 1998) that indicated that IAT effects remain when familiarity was 
controlled for.  However these results do not rule out the possibility that a familiarity 
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effect occurs with this task; it proves that the IAT effect occurs over and above a 
familiarity effect but one cannot conclude that familiarity does not exert an effect at 
all.   
IATs primarily measure category associations rather than associations at the 
level of the exemplar (so that the relevant stimulus feature carries more weight than 
the irrelevant stimulus feature) which indicates that differential familiarity at the level 
of the exemplar will not exert an effect (De Houwer, 2001).  However, it was found 
that individual exemplar associations did exert a significant effect when category 
level associations were neutral (De Houwer, 2003a).  Extrapolating from this it seems 
that differential familiarity of exemplars (the irrelevant feature) may well exert an 
influence on response times when included in a concept category that is neutral in 
valence (relevant feature).  This poses a problem as IATs are often used to investigate 
the valence of a category; results are then difficult to interpret as these may be 
attributable to overall category valence or individual stimuli valence.   
The use of unfamiliar categories by Brendl, Markman and Messner (2001), in 
their investigation of the IAT, resulted in negative evaluations of these categories.  
This occurred even when the unfamiliar categories were actually described as neutral 
or when paired with an opposing category of ‘insects’ (known to be perceived 
negatively).  This may be due to the well-known finding that familiar stimuli are 
perceived more positively than unfamiliar stimuli (Zajonc, 1968).  However, it may 
also be attributable to the possibility that participants used the salience of the category 
to recode the task.  Overall it seems that familiarity is a possible confound that should 
be considered both at the category level and at the level of the exemplar when 
categories used are neutral in valence.   
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 It is suggested that response conflict processes underlie the IAT effect noted 
(De Houwer, 2001).  It seems that the categorisation of a stimulus will activate 
response representations that are associated with the same valence as the target 
concept.  When response assignments of the target concept and attribute are 
compatible only one (the correct) response representation is activated.  When 
response assignments are incompatible both the correct and the incorrect response 
representation will be activated and it will take longer to select the correct response. 
In relation to response conflict processes, Mierke and Klauer (2001) provide 
evidence that suggests that on compatible tasks where attributes and concepts 
correspond in valence (and there is no response conflict), individuals may neglect to 
switch mental task set between attribute and response because basing responses on 
attribute features alone can allow for fast and accurate responding.  Further to this it is 
suggested that shifts in response criteria may account for part of the IAT effect noted 
(Brendl, et. al.  2001).  It is argued that the response threshold may be raised on 
incompatible trials, containing response conflicts, because these will be perceived as 
more difficult due to the fact that they take longer and produce more errors.  These 
possible response strategies pose serious problems for the IAT in that these processes 
may contribute to what the IAT is actually measuring in addition to response conflict 
processes. 
A more fundamental conceptual problem with the IAT is that it may include 
environmental associations in responses along with personal evaluations.  It has been 
argued though that it may be difficult to separate the two (Banaji, 2001) so depending 
on one’s conceptual leanings this may be considered more or less of a problem.  This 
problem has recently been addressed in a variant of the IAT developed by Fazio and 
Olson (2004).  This IAT variant apparently reduces extrapersonal associations by 
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utilising the attribute labels ‘I like’ and ‘I dislike’ in place of the commonly utilised 
‘Pleasant’ and ‘Unpleasant’ attribute labels.  Consistent with the idea that the 
traditional IAT includes societal knowledge in the attitude evaluation, the IAT variant 
examining racial attitudes found significantly less prejudice amongst white people 
than did the traditional IAT (Fazio and Olson, 2004).  In addition the IAT variant also 
displayed higher correlations with explicitly measured attitudes and behavioural 
intentions.  
Although advances have thus been made with regard to discovering the 
underlying processes at work in the IAT, it is also associated with a variety of 
problems, both methodologically and conceptually.  However the IAT is one of the 
most valid and reliable implicit tools available to measure attitudes and remains a 
useful tool due to its continuously high predictive performance.  One proposed 
modification of the IAT is the Go No-Go Association Task (GNAT) (Nosek and 
Banaji, 2001), which has been advanced as possibly solving some of the 
methodological problems associated with the IAT.   
 
The Go No-Go Association Task (GNAT) 
The GNAT essentially requires the categorisation of single attitudinal objects 
against different contextual backgrounds.  This enables the examination of how that 
attitudinal object is evaluated in different contexts.  A context free version is also 
proposed in which the contextual background used is composed of attributes only.  
The procedure in the context free version would require an individual to respond to 
target concepts and one type of attribute (e.g. positive) against a background 
consisting solely of the opposing attribute (e.g. negative).  This would then be 
reversed and the individuals overall evaluation is taken as the difference in 
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responding4 between the two conditions.  Different contexts can be added by 
including other stimuli, related to the particular context required, as part of the 
background which the participant is not required to respond to.    
 The context free version of the GNAT solves one of the main practical 
problems associated with the IAT.  This is that the IAT can only examine evaluations 
of a concept in the context of some other opposing concept whereas the GNAT is able 
to evaluate a single concept in isolation.  However, the possibility that individuals 
may utilise certain response strategies when responding during this task remains.  The 
figure-ground problem raised in association with the IAT is still a concern with the 
context free version of the GNAT, if not a greater concern.  This is due to the format 
in which consideration of the ‘figure’ involves keeping two pieces of information in 
mind (target and attribute required to respond to) whereas consideration of the 
‘ground’ involves keeping just one piece of information in mind (opposing attribute 
not required to respond to).  In addition, problems with participants neglecting to shift 
task set and possibly shifting their response criteria on incompatible trials are likely to 
remain.  The conceptual problems associated with the IAT also remain.  Concepts are 
still examined at the level of the category and this may lack ecological validity.  
Further to this, the possibility still exists that environmental associations may be being 
measured by the task, rather than personal evaluative associations.  However as with 
the IAT (Olson and Fazio, 2004) it may be possible that a GNAT variant using 
attribute labels of ‘I like’ and ‘I dislike’ rather than the previously used attribute labels 
‘Pleasant’ and ‘Unpleasant’ may overcome this problem. 
 Research remains sparse on the GNAT, with little information available on its 
predictive validity.  The little research that has so far been carried out indicates that 
                                                          
4
 This can be evaluated in two ways, either using errors and signal detection theory, or through 
differences in response latencies 
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the GNAT is reliable and, similarly to the IAT, more powerful than most counterparts 
(Nosek and Banaji, 2001).  Its flexibility in being able to measure context free 
associations with particular concepts makes this task a potentially very useful tool.  
 
The Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST) 
 The EAST was developed by De Houwer (2003b) and builds on both the IAT 
and the Affective Simon Task.  This task is similar to the GNAT in that it can 
examine evaluations of individual stimuli but seems to be able to further resolve some 
of the issues associated with these tasks.  The Affective Simon Task (AST) (De 
Houwer and Eelen, 1998) is also a reaction time task that requires participants to 
respond to the stimuli on the basis of a non-affective stimulus feature (e.g. 
grammatical category).  The response required has a positive or negative valence 
itself, for example, participants may be asked to say ‘Good’ when a noun is presented 
and ‘Bad’ when an adjective is presented.  The finding is that the time that 
participants take to select their response is influenced by the valence of the stimuli 
(De Houwer, Crombez, Baeyens and Hermans, 2001).  In this way it is found that the 
required affirmative response to the noun ‘flower’ would be easier to make than the 
required negative response to the adjective ‘happy’.   
Relating this to De Houwer’s (2003a) taxonomy of compatibility tasks, the 
AST features irrelevant S-R compatibility, as the irrelevant feature of valence 
influences responses, but no relevant S-R compatibility or S-S compatibility (see 
Table 1).  Structurally this task is similar to an IAT with neutral categories in which 
the valence of individual stimuli can be inferred.  One problem of the AST is that 
effects can be quite small.  These have been shown to be stronger when presented 
stimuli have a clear valence (Duschere, Holender and Molenaar, 2002) however this is 
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a problem, particularly if investigating the valence of stimuli in which this is not 
immediately clear. 
 The EAST builds on the AST because the responses required are not 
intrinsically valent; that is participants do not have to respond verbally, saying ‘Good’ 
or ‘Bad’.  Response valence instead is introduced by requiring participants to 
complete various evaluation trials in which obviously valent words have to be 
categorised according to their valence by pressing a key.  This then results in those 
keys acquiring the valence of those words.  This same key is also used to denote 
responses to the attitudinal objects on the basis of some other relevant feature but it is 
found that the acquired valence of the response keys will interfere with responses.  
Therefore, if responses are faster when denoted by the key that has acquired the 
positive response rather than when denoted by the key that has acquired the negative 
response, it is assumed that the stimulus is more strongly associated with positive 
attributes.  For example if the stimulus ‘flower’ is required to be categorised as a noun 
using the same response key as is used for denoting a positive valence, responses will 
be facilitated. 
Effect sizes in the EAST are greatly increased from that of the AST although 
still smaller in size than those of the IAT and GNAT (De Houwer, 2003b).  Although 
the EAST seems valid, reliabilities measured so far have also been low.  There are 
various ways in which this can be improved such as increasing the number of trials 
and keeping trial order constant and further testing is required to examine these 
possibilities.   
 A slightly different modification of the AST was proposed by Voss, 
Rothermund and Wentura (2003).  This is similar to the EAST in that valence relevant 
trials are included which emphasise valence, however in addition responses given are 
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intrinsically valent as in the original AST.  In this way participants have to respond by 
saying ‘Good’ or ‘Bad’ whether responding on the basis of valence or not.  This 
variation may be useful in increasing effect sizes but also may make the purpose of 
the task more obvious.  In addition, the requirement of vocal responses is more 
difficult to implement. 
 The AST, the EAST and the modified AST solve several of the problems 
associated with the IAT.  Methodologically these tasks do not compare performances 
on different tasks as does the IAT but instead compare trials within the same task.  
This makes these less likely to be influenced by effects that may impact upon 
participant’s response strategies including figure-ground effects, response criterion 
shift and task set shifting and also removes any concerns regarding familiarity effects.  
In addition the AST and its offshoots enable the researcher to examine single 
associations by themselves rather than in the context of something else (De Houwer, 
2003b).  Further to this stimuli can be examined at the individual level which can be 
argued to make the task more ecologically valid.  As with each of these implicit tasks, 
the possibility that environmental associations are influencing results remains 
although again the use of more personal attribute labels such as ‘I like/dislike’ rather 
than ‘good/bad’ may help to overcome this. 
 
The development of implicit tasks and which one to use? 
 The continual development and improvement of implicit tasks in the area of 
attitude evaluation has meant that these tools are increasingly valid and reliable, 
reinforcing the usefulness of these tasks as a tool in other areas of research rather than 
as a point of investigation in themselves.  Of course there are still uncertainties and 
points of disagreement which have yet to be resolved in order to provide a clearer 
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understanding of processes involved.  However the speed of progress in this area 
indicates that a more complete understanding is not far off. 
In future, research should be concentrated on improving the reliability of 
implicit measures and on increasing the understanding the conceptual underpinnings 
of implicitly measured attitudes.  Affective priming and the IAT are currently the 
most useful tasks in this area, due to their high reliability and validity, despite the 
many criticisms levelled at them.  The GNAT and the AST and its relatives also seem 
like very promising tasks in the area although as yet further research is required to 
establish their usefulness. 
 With regard to investigating particular attitudes that people hold, it is 
suggested that a combined approach be taken utilising both explicit and implicit tasks 
to gain a more complete picture.  Explicit tasks utilised can also be improved by 
minimising demand characteristics and including measures of social desirability in 
order to eliminate these influences as sources of variation. 
 
Conclusion 
Overall it seems that at the most basic conceptual level, disagreements remain 
as to the nature of implicitly measured attitudes.  The prevailing view seems to be that 
implicit attitudes and explicit attitudes are actually different measures of the same 
thing.  However, the model of dual attitudes suggests that implicit and explicit 
attitudes can be separate constructs that exist alongside each other.  This view is 
coherent and as yet there is little evidence that conclusively proves or disproves either 
model.  The relationship between explicit and implicit attitudes is therefore hugely 
thought provoking and much researched.  Empirical reports of correlations between 
explicitly and implicitly measured attitudes are varied but in some circumstances are 
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very low.  There are a variety of reasons suggested for this, including of course the 
very reason that implicit tasks are heralded, namely the assertion that these can bypass 
confounding factors of self-presentation effects.  Further to this it is suggested that 
low correlations between explicit and implicit tasks may be largely due to the low 
reliabilities of implicit tasks.  In addition, there are concerns over the convergent 
validity of implicit tasks and the possibility that different tasks are measuring different 
things; possibly different aspects of the same construct, or even different constructs.  
Implicit tasks that have emerged as most valid and reliable are priming measures and 
the IAT.  It seems then that the most useful direction for research in this area is to 
concentrate on these two main types of task and offshoots from these.  It is 
recommended that future research should concentrate on improving the reliability of 
implicit measures and clarifying their conceptual basis.  This will ultimately then 
clarify attitudinal structure and may help to relate attitudes and behaviour. 
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